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CONTRACTING AROUND TWOMBLY
Daphna Kapeliuk*
Alon Klement**
INTRODUCTION
Pleading standards lie at the center of a heated debate. Following
the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 commentators have advanced two approaches to
pleading. One approach is mainly concerned with allowing plaintiffs
access to courts and advocates the low threshold requirement of the
liberal pleading standard first established by Conley v. Gibson3 and
applied for over fifty years in the federal courts. The other approach,
which is interested in efficiently deterring the filing of frivolous law-
suits, supports the heightened standard that was endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.4 Each approach maintains that
its preferred standard would realize better justice in the federal courts.
Both are premised on the foundational assumption that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) are uniform and transsub-
stantive.5
This Article follows a different approach. Instead of joining the de-
bate over the optimal transsubstantive pleading standard, we study
the implications of that standard in a well-defined subset of cases-
those in which the parties have prior contractual relationships. 6 We
show that if contracting parties are allowed to contract around the
pleading standard that would apply to their prospective disputes, they
will be able to solve problems of inadequate screening and to realize
* Lecturer, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Radzyner School of Law.
** Professor, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Radzyner School of Law.
1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General Rules," 2009
Wis. L. REV. 535 (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal illustrate the limits of and the costs cre-
ated by transsubstantivity).
6. Between January 2007 and October 2009, an average of 2,806 cases were filed per month.
Rule 12 motions to dismiss were filed in 1,780 of those cases. Of these motions, 499 on average
were granted. See Statistical Information on Motions to Dismiss re Twombly/Iqbal, Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts Statistics Division, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Motions-to-Dismiss_060110.pdf.
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both pre- and post-dispute opportunities that would be unworkable
otherwise. As we demonstrate, the option to modify the pleading
standard would improve justice and efficiency, irrespective of the
transsubstantive pleading standard that applies absent contractual
modification.
As transsubstantive rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure aim
at securing a just, expeditious, and efficient resolution of all civil dis-
putes in the federal courts.7 The Rules are designed to satisfy both
the need for substantive justice and the need for a workable procedu-
ral system, so as to ensure that litigants have their day in court.8 The
basic assumption that underlies the Rules is that they should apply to
every type of case, regardless of its substantive nature or its merits. 9
The Rules are based on the notions of uniformity and transsubstantiv-
ity, which dictate that they should be applied and interpreted in the
same manner in all cases, irrespective of the subject matter in
dispute.10
The Rules are designed to achieve efficiency and justice for every
type of case. They purport to represent a balanced combination of
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[The Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."); see also Des Isles v.
Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955) (stating that the primary purpose of the Rules is to
secure "speedy and inexpensive justice in a uniform and well ordered manner").
8. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938).
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings
in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81."); Paul D. Carrington, Making
Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non- Trans-
Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1988) ("[P]rocedural rules
should have general applicability."); but see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of Ameri-
can Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934-35 (1988) (arguing
that he knows of no support for Carrington's proposition that by enacting the Federal Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 "Congress intended not only that the same Federal Rules be applicable in
all federal district courts, but that the same Rules be applicable in all types of cases, that, in other
words, the Rules be not only uniform but also trans-substantive").
10. On the debate about the desirability of transsubstantive rules, see, for example, Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2008)
(arguing that many procedural rules do not seem to be transsubstantive but are "driven by par-
ticular substantive concerns"); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Su-
preme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-17 (1988)
(arguing that procedural rules should be tailored to specific substantive areas); Carrington, supra
note 9, at 2079-81 (arguing against substantive tailoring of the Rules); Robert M. Cover, For
James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 731 (1974)
(criticizing the transsubstantive nature of the Rules); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices
and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2245-46 (1989) (claiming that "although the Federal Rules are trans-substantive, they are not
trans-procedural"); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 48-49, 54-55 (1994) (argu-
ing against a system of general rules uniformly applied and in favor of rules more closely tailored
to distinctions among case types).
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procedural values that applies uniformly to all cases in the federal
courts." As such, they are characterized by a compromise between
different interests that might stand in conflict with each other.12
While the Rules are designed to provide efficiency and justice in the
aggregate, these goals might not be realized in every case. When fed-
eral courts apply the Rules irrespective of their individual particulari-
ties, the Rules might undermine the efficiency or the justice in
"outlier" cases-cases that do not match the typical case envisaged by
the framers of the Rules. This is a major drawback of transsubstantive
uniform rules.' 3
The inability of compromise-based transsubstantive procedural
rules to provide efficiency and justice in all types of cases has assumed
importance in the debate that followed Twombly and Iqbal.14 At the
center of the debate stands the question of whether pleading stan-
dards should apply to all cases or be case-specific. 15
The pleading standard serves as the gateway to the judicial sys-
tem.16 It is embodied in Rule 8, which requires the plaintiff to provide
a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief."17 The Rule, which has been termed the "key-
11. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1731 (2004) ("[R]ulemakers have consistently interpreted to require Fed-
eral Rules that both apply in all federal district courts and that apply in all types of civil cases
(i.e., are trans-substantive).").
12. One such compromise is the balance between access to courts and efficiency. On balanc-
ing these competing interests see, for example, Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Un-
quenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over
Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1217-19 (2008).
13. See Paul David Menair, Recasting Complaints: An Argument for Procedural Alternatives,
12 CHAP. L. REV. 333, 354 (2008) (discussing "the pitfalls of trans-substantive procedure's at-
tempt to capture all of the nuances of civil practice in one conception of the civil action"); but see
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 920-21 (1999) (arguing that different areas of sub-
stantive law would be justified only "if procedure varied extensively with substance" and that
"redesigning a procedural system for each substantive area would be wasteful"); Burbank, supra
note 9, at 1929-41 (criticizing proponents of transsubstantivity for relying on judges to "bridge
the gap between formal equality and inequality in fact").
14. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REv. 873, 936 (2009) (arguing that case-screening rules should be substance-specific
rather than transsubstantive); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV.
90, 146 (2009) (rejecting a rigidly transsubstantive approach and recommending bifurcating
pleading standards along cost-disparity lines).
15. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 936.
16. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Few issues in civil
procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that
opens access to courts.").
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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stone"18 or the "jewel in the crown" 19 of the procedural system em-
bodied in the Federal Rules, was designed to simplify the pleading
system20 and to "focus litigation on the merits of a claim."21 As the
starting point of the litigation process, the Rule's primary objective
has traditionally been to put the defendant on notice of the claim as-
serted against him.22
When a court is presented with a motion to dismiss a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), it applies the pleading standard to examine whether
the claimant failed "to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." 23 By setting the threshold requirements that the plaintiff
must satisfy in order to have access to discovery and other procedural
mechanisms applied throughout litigation, this Rule serves as the
gatekeeper to the federal courts.24
For over fifty years, since the Supreme Court's decision in Conley,
courts have interpreted the threshold requirement of the pleading
standard liberally, 25 asserting that "a complaint should not be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." 26 The rationale behind the liberal con-
18. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, at 470
(6th ed. 2002) ("The keystone of the system of procedure embodied in the rules is Rule 8.").
19. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998).
20. The drafters of the Federal Rules did not want to follow the common law and code plead-
ing regime. See generally Stancil, supra note 14, at 90.
21. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
22. At common law, pleadings served not only notice, but also "factual development, win-
nowing issues, and disposing of sham claims." Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice
Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987, 990 n.17 (2003) (citing WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 18).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
24. For exceptions to the Rule, see FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which requires that "a party must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." See also Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); Richard L. Marcus,
The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 435 (1986) (claiming, long before Twombly, that "[n]ot only has pleading practice survived,
but fact pleading, the bte noir of the codes, seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of areas
in which courts refuse to accept 'conclusory' allegations as sufficient under the Federal Rules").
25. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 ("Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard of pleading,
'[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."') (quoting Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (alteration in original)). See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (discussing the "liberal
system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal rules").
26. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). But see Christopher Fairman, Heightened
Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REV. 551, 553-54 (2002), which claims that despite the Supreme Court's
decision in Conley, federal courts have adopted heightened pleading standards in a variety of
situations, such as civil rights, conspiracy, defamation, and antitrust and asserting that
[w]hole categories of cases have been singled out for special procedural treatment,
thereby limiting the substantive rights of certain plaintiffs. Erecting these procedural
[Vol. 60:14
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struction of the pleading standard was to preserve the plaintiff's abil-
ity to get her day in court and to uphold the principle that "the
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." 2 7
The application of a liberal pleading standard ensured that the notice
was sufficient to prevent surprise from the defendant 28 and relied on
summary judgment to bar frivolous claims from reaching trial.29
Under the liberal pleading standard, most complaints passed the
pleading threshold. 30
The recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have endorsed a new
paradigm. Twombly dismissed an antitrust class action for alleged
parallel conduct unfavorable to competition. 31 The Court repudiated
Conley's liberal "no set of facts" pleading standard and ordered the
dismissal of the case. 32 It stated that the pleading standard requires
the plaintiff to allege facts that suggest "plausible grounds" 3 3 for the
existence of the alleged misconduct and stressed that the complaint
must include factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level." 34 Following this standard, a plaintiff may
no longer state a general description of her claim and await pretrial
discovery to reveal the necessary evidence to support her allegations.
Stating a claim "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a for-
hurdles creates classes of disfavored cases and denies plaintiffs determination on the
merits-a substantive effect masked as procedural. In the process, the transsubstantive
nature of the rules is eroded; the procedure of procedure is ignored.
27. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
28. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512; Tang v. New York, 487 F.2d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 1973)
(noting that the aim of Rule 8 is to "prevent surprise").
29. See, e.g., Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1820 (2008)
("[Tihe Supreme Court throughout the latter half of the twentieth century largely embraced a
liberal pleading standard and allowed a case to proceed so long as the adversary had 'fair notice'
of the claim. Policy considerations and concerns regarding unmeritorious claims were, under this
regime, properly addressed at the discovery and summary judgment stage.").
30. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 441, 451-52 (2010) ("Despite these lower court attempts to impose heightened pleading
standards after Conley, the Supreme Court consistently rebuffed them."); Fairman, supra note
22, at 997 ("[W]hen called upon to address pleading issues square on, the Court continually-
and unanimously-embraces simplified notice pleading.").
31. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
32. A defendant who claims that a pleading motion fails to pass the pleading threshold may
file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court faced with such motion does not hear
any challenge to the merits of the case, but rather accepts the allegations in the claim as true and
grants the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts pled. See
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, 'we do not
assess the truth of what is asserted or determin[e] whether a plaintiff has any evidence to back
up what is in the complaint."' (quoting ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C.
Cir. 1991))).
33. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
34. Id. at 555.
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mulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suf-
fice."35 Relying on the pitfalls of costly discovery, the Court stated
that because "the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases," it is necessary that the plead-
ing standard will remove those cases which have not founded the hope
that discovery will reveal relevant evidence to support the claim.36
Some commentators hoped that the Twombly pleading standard
would be confined to antitrust cases.37 However, this hope was unful-
filled in Iqbal, which asserted that the heightened pleading standard
applies transsubstantively to all civil actions, irrespective of their par-
ticularities. 38 Thus, the debate over the aggregate implications of the
Twombly pleading standard has intensified after Iqbal. Some com-
mentators argue that the decisions are not revolutionary but rather
are consistent with the Supreme Court's prior notice pleading ap-
proach, 39 while others defend the decisions as setting the correct
pleading standard.40 But the vast majority of commentators have
strongly criticized Twombly's standard for radically departing from
prior policy and its devastating consequences on plaintiffs' access to
the courts.41
35. Id.
36. Id. at 559.
37. Some commentators originally suggested that Twombly does not speak about procedural
law, but rather about antitrust law. See generally Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not
Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 117 (2007); but see Richard A.
Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judg-
ments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 64 (2007) (arguing that "[t]here is no reason to confine the
logic of [Twombly's] decision to antitrust cases").
38. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
39. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
474 (2010) (arguing that the Twombly standard "can be understood as equivalent to the tradi-
tional insistence that a factual inference be reasonable"); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=1442786 (challenging "the conventional wisdom that Iqbal and Twombly
run roughshod over a half-century's worth of accumulated wisdom on pleading standards").
40. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2009)
("Twombly thus presents a welcome clarification of modern pleading standards that is likely to
increase the efficiency and fairness of modern civil practice.").
41. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 14, at 875 ("Many judges and academic commentators read the
decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading practice."); Scott Dodson, Plead-
ing Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 135. 138 (2007) ("Clearly,
Conley's 'no set of facts' language is dead."); Brian Thomas Fitzsimons, The Injustice of Notice &
Heightened Pleading Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims: It Is Time to Balance the Scale
for Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Society, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 199, 201 (2007) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court's decision in Twombly should be set aside); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1261
(criticizing Twombly for ignoring "information asymmetries"); Randy Picker, Twombly, Leegin,
and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 Sup. CT. REV. 161. 177 ("Twombly shrinks the domain of
private plaintiffs"); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432, 437
(2008) (arguing that Twombly is "quite at odds with the Court's position heretofore" and a
6 [Vol. 60:1
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Unlike the vast recent scholarship on pleading standards, we do not
take sides in the debate over which is the most just, fair, and efficient
transsubstantive pleading standard. Instead, we focus on a subset of
disputes in which litigants had prior contractual relationships. Our
premise is that whichever standard is more adequate in the aggregate,
there are cases in which its application might frustrate the goals that it
purports to achieve. The application of the Twombly standard might
bar suits from reaching the courts, even if they should be heard. Con-
versely, the pre-Twombly standard might allow claims in court, even if
they should have been barred.
Focusing on the Twombly standard, we argue that some instances in
which the application of the standard would perform inadequate
screening can be remedied. 4 2 We explain that parties who have a con-
tractual relationship prior to the dispute can overcome this inade-
quacy by agreeing at the contracting stage to opt for the pre-Twombly
standard.43 We show that in some cases a contractual stipulation for
this standard would not only serve as a better screening mechanism of
suits, but it would also increase the contracting parties' joint surplus in
three ways: (1) by eliminating strategic opportunistic behavior, (2) by
affecting the incentives of the parties to comply with their contractual
obligations and the substantive rules applicable to their legal relation-
ship, and (3) by enabling parties to signal information that would oth-
erwise be unavailable to their counterparts.44
Hence, we propose a novel approach for addressing the question of
whether the Twombly standard performs better than its predecessor
in contract cases. We suggest that the answer to this question should
be informed by analyzing the costs of modifying the Twombly stan-
dard and the difficulties in implementing such modification, in addi-
tion to evaluating the proportion of cases in which the standard would
have been chosen by contracting parties. As we show, even if in the
aggregate the Twombly pleading standard would have been chosen
less often, it may still promise improved efficiency and justice in con-
tract cases due to its lower modification costs.
"break from the Court's previous embrace of notice pleading" and that requiring plaintiffs to
offer factual allegations that plausibly suggest liability is a particular burden when key facts are
likely obtainable only through discovery); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And
What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 245, 278 (2008) (arguing that Twombly represents "a substantial change to the pleading
standard that had traditionally applied in federal court"); Leading Cases-Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 309 (2007) ("The majority's view runs counter to the text of
the Rules, Supreme Court precedent, and the historical purpose of notice pleading.").
42. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part II identifies the circumstances
in which the Twombly standard would induce inadequate screening
and discusses the implications of any such inadequacies on the parties'
pre-dispute behavior.4 5 This Part also explains why the Twombly
standard cannot be modified by the litigants after the dispute arises.
Part III features the advantages of pre-dispute modifications of the
Twombly standard.46 It examines how such modifications can correct
screening inadequacies, maximize the parties' joint contractual sur-
plus, and allow them to signal their private information and choose
prospective counterparts based on their private information at the
time of contracting. Part IV explains the alternative ways for contrac-
tually modifying the Twombly standard. 4 7 It examines the costs of
such modifications and concludes that because the modification of the
Twombly standard is more feasible and less costly to implement than
the modification of the pre-Twombly standard, it may prove better in
contract cases.
II. SCREENING UNDER THE TWOMBLY PLEADING STANDARD
Access to the courts is not without its limits. 4 8 Screening mecha-
nisms enable the courts to draw the line between suits that should
proceed to trial on their merits and those that should be barred from
being pursued. As a matter of fairness and efficiency, such mecha-
nisms aim at striking a balance between the claimant's interest in hav-
ing her day in court and the defendant's interest in avoiding the
harassment of meritless suits. 4 9 Screening mechanisms purport to en-
able access to justice for claimants while protecting defendants and
the judicial system from undue costs and burdens.50
The following screening mechanisms are available at the pretrial
stage: (1) the Rule 11 requirement that attorneys certify the propriety
of any pleadings, motions, and other papers they sign; (2) Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
45. See infra notes 48-75 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
48. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1169.
49. Bone, supra note 14, at 909 ("[A] procedural system must balance two moral rights: the
defendant's right to be free from intentionally filed meritless suits and the plaintiff's right of
access to file a meritorious suit."); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1218 (claiming that the judicial
system should be "open to claimants, but if the doors of justice are opened too wide, then means
are needed for intercepting those cases that, in hindsight, ought not to have been welcomed in
the first place").
50. See ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) 125-49 (analyzing
the error and process costs of pleading rules).
8 [Vol. 60:1
CONTRACTING AROUND TWOMBLY
granted; (3) Rule 16, which allows the court to eliminate frivolous
claims; and (4) the Rule 56 summary judgment motion. The purpose
of each of these mechanisms is to distinguish between meritorious
suits that should be heard and frivolous suits that are filed by opportu-
nistic claimants attempting to extract nuisance settlements from de-
fendants. Of these mechanisms, the pleading standard set by Rule 8
and examined on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss induces the earli-
est screening by the court in its pre-discovery capacity. If Rule
12(b)(6) is adequately applied, it has the potential to screen out frivo-
lous suits most effectively.51
Like the underlying notion of any procedural rule, the basic premise
of the pleading standard is to balance the interests of the adversarial
litigants by ensuring fairness and efficiency in the resolution of their
dispute.52 However, as the standard is transsubstantive and applies
uniformly to all types of civil suits regardless of their specific charac-
teristics or merit, there may be instances in which it would prove inad-
equate by frustrating the fragile balance between the litigants'
interests.
Because the pleading standard serves as the gatekeeper to the fed-
eral courts and is applied prior to discovery, a court's decision follow-
ing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a claim for failing to comply with its
requirements could have severe implications for a claimant who
wishes to have her day in court. Similarly, a court's rejection of a
motion to dismiss may have adverse consequences over a defendant
who would then have to incur the high costs of discovery before he
could move for summary judgment. Thus, while in many instances a
pleading standard may effectively screen cases, there are other in-
stances in which its application might fail to do so. In the remainder
of this Article, we explain these inadequacies, discussing their effects
51. Rule 12(b)(6) has been termed "the most promising new tool" in the regulation of cases at
the pleading stage. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1221; see also Spencer, supra note 41, at 486
(claiming that the Twombly Court rejected the other mechanisms as ineffective and "turn[ed]
the entire system on its head by transforming the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into the front-end
gatekeeper against groundless claims").
52. See, e.g., 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21(1)(a) (3d ed.
2010) ("The application of orderly rules of procedure does not require the sacrifice of fundamen-
tal justice, but rather the Rules must be construed to promote justice for both parties, not to
defeat it. This mandate is met if substantial justice is accomplished between the parties."); see
also Bone, supra note 14, at 908 ("[P]laintiff's right to access must be balanced against defen-
dant's right to reasons."); Carrington, supra note 9, at 2074 ("Procedure rules that are, or are
even seen to be, designed to favor one set of litigants produce outcomes that are less acceptable
to their adversaries. In the larger and most traditional senses of the phrase, Equal Protection of
the Law requires a 'level playing field' in legal dispute resolution."); Fairman, supra note 22, at
990 ("[T]he Federal Rules are essentially a reform effort designed to ensure litigants have their
day in court.").
2010] 9
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on pre-dispute behavior and the inability to correct them through
post-dispute stipulations.
A. Inadequate Screening: The Asymmetric Information Barrier
The Twombly pleading standard demands greater factual specificity
from the plaintiff than its predecessor. While, according to the pre-
Twombly standard, a plaintiff's complaint "should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief,"53 the new standard requires the plaintiff to al-
lege facts which render the claim "plausible" 54 and sufficient to "raise
a right to relief above the speculative level."55
When the plaintiff possesses the information necessary to assert the
facts to meet the burden of the "plausibility" threshold, the Twombly
standard is adequate. 56 The plaintiff would have no trouble in
presenting sufficient evidence to support her assertions that she is en-
titled to relief. The balance between the opposing interests of the liti-
gants would therefore be properly maintained.
The Twombly standard is also effective in weeding out meritless
claims. A strategic plaintiff who files a frivolous suit hoping to extract
a nuisance settlement from the defendant would be barred from pur-
suing it to the discovery stage under Twombly. The claimant's obliga-
tion to provide facts in support of her allegations enables the court to
curtail abusive and opportunistic behavior by dismissing any unsub-
stantiated frivolous claim at an early pretrial stage. Because the plain-
tiff who files a frivolous suit would not be able to produce the facts
supporting her allegation at the filing stage, the dismissal of her claim
would protect the defendant from extensive discovery and high costs.
Thus, the Twombly pleading standard efficiently screens out frivolous
suits.
The situation is different when the plaintiff has a meritorious claim
but does not possess the necessary facts to pass the Twombly thresh-
old.57 This situation is characterized by "information asymmetry" at
53. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
54. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
55. Id. at 555.
56. Bone, supra note 14, at 909 ("[S]tricter pleading treats plaintiffs who do not have access to
information less favorably than plaintiffs who do have access.").
57. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.9 (2007) ("Any
heightened pleading rule . . . could have the effect of preventing a plaintiff from getting discov-
ery on a claim that might have gone to a jury, had discovery occurred and yielded substantial
evidence."); Bone, supra note 14, at 884 ("[Enhancing the pleading burden risks screening meri-
torious suits."); Spencer, supra note 41, at 488 (stressing that by imposing the Twombly standard,
[Vol. 60:110
CONTRACTING AROUND TWOM3LY
the pre-filing stage.58 It is often the case that a defendant has exclu-
sive access to relevant information and evidence critical to the claim. 59
When the information is in the defendant's sole custody, the plaintiff
will not be able to assert facts that she cannot know prior to discov-
ery.60 In this case, the Twombly standard might bar the plaintiff from
pursuing her claim in court, even if it has merit.61 Thus, when the
information needed is privately held by the defendant, and the plain-
tiff cannot access it with reasonable investigation, the Twombly stan-
dard may result in the dismissal of claims that should have proceeded
to discovery.62
We do not claim that the Twombly standard is always inferior to its
predecessor. We only make the point that it might perform inade-
quate screening under certain circumstances. Under the pre-Twombly
standard, a plaintiff with a meritorious claim who did not possess the
relevant facts to substantiate her allegation would not be barred from
engaging in discovery to uncover the necessary evidence.63 The stan-
dard relied on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions
to screen out frivolous claims. Thus, if the claim had merit, the claim-
ant could reveal the facts needed to support her allegations, and the
case would proceed to trial.
Nevertheless, in the cases where the Twombly standard would per-
form proper screening, the pre-Twombly standard failed to do so.
When the defendant did not hold any private information, the liberal
pleading standard allowed the plaintiff to proceed with a lawsuit and
the Court makes it possible "that valid claims that could have found support through discovery
never make it into the system").
58. See, e.g., Matthew A. Josephson, Note, Some Things Are Better Left Said: Pleading Prac-
tice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REv. 867, 894 (2008) ("Plaintiffs often face
the problem of not being able to access concrete evidence at the pleading stage because the
information concerning a particular controversy is accessible to only one party, usually the
defendant.").
59. Picker, supra note 41, at 164 ("Plaintiffs will often have much less information about possi-
ble liability than defendants.").
60. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 41, at 481 (claiming that "plausibility pleading rejects poten-
tially valid, meritorious claims" and that under this standard there is no confidence that a claim
that was dismissed was frivolous or not).
61. See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1256.
62. During the pre-Twombly era, a plaintiff could state her allegations "upon information and
belief" when she did not possess the information necessary to assert her allegations. See, e.g.,
Hartnett, supra note 39, at 503. This was also the case in Twombly. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (quoting 1 96 of the complaint). This traditional formulation solved the
problem of information asymmetry. However, under the Twombly regime, it seems that such a
formulation would not suffice to cross the heightened pleading standard. See Hartnett, supra
note 39, at 505 (suggesting that "the phrase 'upon information and belief' . . . should be retired").
63. Spencer, supra note 41, at 482 (arguing that a liberal pleading standard is appropriate in
instances where the plaintiff does not possess the information needed to assert her allegations).
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extract a positive settlement from the defendant, even if she knew it
was frivolous.64 In those cases, the Twombly standard would prove
better.
B. The Pre-Dispute Implications of Inadequate Screening
Like the implications of any procedural rule, those of Rules 8 and
12(b)(6) are not limited to the post-dispute filing stage. They are also
relevant before the dispute.
Procedural rules direct and shape the parties' behavior during litiga-
tion, as well as before a dispute arises or a suit is filed.65 Because the
parties expect any future dispute to be litigated according to the Fed-
eral Rules, these Rules affect the probable outcome that litigation
would shape the parties' pre-dispute behavior. They affect the par-
ties' incentives to comply with substantive law as well as the parties'
willingness to engage in a dispute, to bring a suit, to invest in the liti-
gation, or to consider the possibility of a settlement. 66
Similarly, any screening mechanism may incentivize the parties' be-
havior before and after a dispute arises. As a procedural device, a
screening mechanism would affect the parties' decisions whether to
comply with substantive law and, if a dispute arises, whether to engage
in litigation or settle.
As we explained, the application of the Twombly pleading standard
as a screening mechanism might be inappropriate in cases of post-dis-
pute information asymmetry-cases in which a plaintiff with a merito-
rious claim lacks the factual assertions necessary to pass the pleading
threshold because such information is privately held by the defendant.
In these cases, a prospective defendant who knows that he will have
exclusive possession of the relevant information and that the claimant
will not have access to this information prior to discovery might re-
duce his level of care and have weaker incentives to satisfy his legal
64. For an economic analysis of the plaintiff's opportunity to extract a positive settlement
based on the defendant's discovery costs, see David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in
Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); Stancil,
supra note 20, at 92; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected-Value Suits
(Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 656, 2009).
65. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 272-73 (2002);
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 392-401 (2004); Steven
Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 99, 100-01 (1999).
66. The analysis of procedural rules from an ex ante perspective was first advocated in Bruce
L. Hay, Procedural Justice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997). For a more
critical approach, see generally Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with
Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003); Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004).
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duties because he knows that any suit brought against him is likely to
be dismissed prior to discovery. Thus, the Twombly standard might
dilute the defendant's incentives to comply with substantive law.
Take, for example, a medical negligence case. A prospective defen-
dant who knows that he will have sole knowledge and control of the
evidence about his level of care prior to the dispute will abstain from
exercising care because a prospective claimant will not be able to pur-
sue a claim against him without obtaining the necessary information
through discovery. Exercising care is costly, and because the expected
sanction for not exercising care is low due to the high probability of
early dismissal, a prospective defendant would prefer not to exercise
due care.
Again, the pre-Twombly pleading standard might have adverse pre-
dispute implications. In the medical negligence example, under the
pre-Twombly standard, prospective defendants might expect opportu-
nistic claimants to file suits irrespective of the merits of their claims.
Because defendants would have to incur the high costs of discovery
before being able to move for summary judgment, this would raise the
cost of medical services and lower incentives for exercising proper
care. 67 Thus, in cases of expected information symmetry after the dis-
pute, the pre-Twombly standard had its unique pre-dispute inefficien-
cies. Such inefficiencies are corrected by the stricter Twombly
standard.
C. Correcting Screening Inadequacies: The Zero-Sum Problem
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure feature a flexible approach
that allows litigants to agree to procedural stipulations.68 For exam-
ple, litigants may consent to waive the right to a jury trial,69 to agree
on the extent of discovery proceedings70 or to the taking of deposi-
tions,71 or consent to forgo their right to appeal. 72 Litigants would
agree to make such stipulations if the stipulations would reduce their
litigation expenditures, lower their risks, and not adversely affect the
67. For an analysis of the effect of inaccuracy of judgments on activity levels and incentives to
take care, see generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Dam-
ages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determina-
tion of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
68. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008) ("One of the hallmarks
of the U.S. law is the extent to which the rules of procedure are 'default' rules, rules that govern
if the parties have not agreed to something else.").
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(1).
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 29; see also Jay E. Grenig, Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure, 21
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 547-48 (1998).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 29(a).
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expected outcome of the litigation.73 Thus, by customizing their litiga-
tion procedures to fit their specific needs, adversaries can improve the
efficiency and justice of their individual lawsuits.74
Litigants will agree to make procedural stipulations if such arrange-
ments are well-suited to their interests. However, when their interests
are diametrically opposed-that is, when the arrangement benefits
only one litigant and undermines the interests of her adversary-the
litigants will not agree. This situation is characterized by the paradigm
of a "zero-sum game." A zero-sum game is a strategic situation in
which one party's gain implies the other party's loss.75 Clearly, in a
zero-sum game, litigants are not likely to agree to any procedural stip-
ulation. Even if a litigant was willing to pay her adversary for agree-
ing to shift from one rule to its alternative, the most she would be
willing to pay would equal her gain from that shift. However, because
this gain equals her adversary's loss, the adversary would be willing to
assume it only for a larger payment. Therefore, in any zero-sum game
situation, no agreement between the litigants is possible.
The choice of a pleading standard is a prototypical example of a
zero-sum game situation. While litigants may reduce costs and risks
by agreeing to modify procedures, they are unlikely to agree to mod-
ify the applicable pleading standard even when its application results
in inadequate screening. The reason is simple: any agreement to shift
to the alternative standard would be purely distributive, benefiting the
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
Take, for example, a case where the defendant possesses the infor-
mation needed by the plaintiff to pass the Twombly standard. After
the dispute arises, the defendant has no interest in agreeing to supply
the plaintiff with the relevant information to substantiate her allega-
tions. Thus, the defendant is unlikely to agree to the pre-Twombly
standard under which the plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss.
Similarly, the defendant would not agree to waive his right to file a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a
claim. Because the plaintiff's and the defendant's interests stand in
72. See, e.g., Acton v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpub-
lished table decision); U.S. Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Chaddock & Co., 173 F. 577, 579 (9th
Cir. 1909) (dismissing appeal based on post-dispute agreement).
73. For a general discussion of stipulations, see 73 AM. JUR. 2D Stipulations § 15 (2001).
74. For a thorough discussion of post-dispute procedural stipulations, see generally Michael L.
Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 461 (2007).
75. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 158 (1958); MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 21 (1994).
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direct conflict, no arrangement to opt out of the Twombly pleading
standard is feasible.
In conclusion, the Twombly pleading standard may serve as a just
and efficient screening mechanism in many cases. However, because
it cannot accommodate all cases, its application might obstruct effi-
ciency and justice in cases of meritorious claims characterized by
asymmetric information where the defendant holds private informa-
tion that is essential to establish his liability. Such inefficiencies would
be pronounced before and after the dispute.
While an agreement to opt for the pre-Twombly standard cannot be
beneficial for both litigants from their post-dispute perspectives, this is
not the case when the argument is made before the dispute arises. As
we show next, such an agreement can be beneficial for contracting
parties if it is made at the pre-dispute stage when the parties agree on
their substantive rights and obligations in performing their contract.
We show that because the parties' interests are aligned at the time of
contracting, they can realize a mutual joint surplus by opting for the
screening standard that would best accommodate their specific
circumstances.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTING AROUND TWOMBLY
In the previous Part, we showed how the Twombly pleading stan-
dard might lead to inaccurate screening. 76 We also explained why the
zero-sum characteristic of the pleading standard makes it impossible
for litigants to modify it once a dispute arises and a suit is filed.
In this Part, we explain how contracting parties can avoid the inade-
quacies of the Twombly standard by agreeing ahead of the dispute, at
the time of contracting, to adopt a procedural mechanism that would
better screen their prospective suits.7 7 We show that contracting par-
ties can increase their joint surplus in the contract by mutually agree-
ing to opt out of the Twombly standard and adopt its predecessor."
We also argue that the parties can overcome the zero-sum problem
ingrained in pleading standards and that they can successfully address
any pre-dispute inefficiencies caused by inappropriate screening.79
We further explore additional benefits that the contracting parties can
76. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
77. Much of the theoretical analysis in this Section relies on Steven Shavell, Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995), and Hay, supra note 66, at
1803. See also Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 209 (2000).
78. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
79. See infra Part III.B.
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realize by agreeing to adopt the pre-Twombly standard. We explain
how any such pre-dispute stipulations can curtail strategic opportu-
nism and efficiently structure the parties' primary behavior.80 Finally,
we show how a pre-Twombly stipulation enables the parties to signal
information they exclusively possess at the contracting stage and to
sort among prospective counterparts based on that private
information.81
Pre-dispute procedural stipulations are not foreign to contracts. 82
For instance, contracting parties often agree to adopt forum selection
clauses,83 choice of law clauses, 84 clauses dealing with appointment of
service agents or waiver of notice,85 limitation period clauses, 86 or
clauses waiving the right to a trial by jury.87 Contracts may also mod-
80. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
81. See Part III.C infra.
82. See generally Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re) Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake
the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 579 (2007); David H.
Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Con-
tract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 1085 (2002);
Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 181.
83. See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972) (holding that forum
selection clauses are prima facie valid in federal courts sitting in admiralty).
84. See U.C.C. § 1-301 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 (1988)
("Issues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with the rule
of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in accordance with the rule of § 188."); see also Dykes
v. DePuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[C]ourts will uphold the parties' choice as long as
the result is not contrary to public policy and as long as the designated state has some substantial
relation to the contract." (quoting Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 362 N.E.2d 222, 228 (Mass. App.
1977))).
85. See, e.g., Nat'l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (holding that
parties may agree "to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice
altogether"); see also Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 15, 27 (E.D. Tenn. 1969)
(citing Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 311); Barker v. Greenstreet Fin., L.P., 823 So. 2d 195, 196 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (upholding service by mail and noting that contractual provisions for service were
effective and did not violate rules, statutes, or due process). The Federal Rules provide for
waiver of service of process and direct mailing of the complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(G).
86. In some jurisdictions, parties may limit the time in which actions based on contract may be
brought. See, e.g., Gifford v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1946);
Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 841 F. Supp. 877, 879 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (citing
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947) (stating that limitation
periods are valid provided they are reasonable)). Some jurisdictions also recognize the ability to
contractually extend the statute of limitations for a reasonable time. See, e.g., Collins v. Envtl.
Sys. Co., 3 F.3d 238, 242 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Minnesota law). Others, however, do not
allow parties to extend the statute of limitations at all. See, e.g., E.L. Burns Co. v. Cashio, 302
So. 2d 297, 301 (La. 1974) (denying the right to extend the statute of limitations).
87. See U.S. CONsT. art. VII. Federal Rule 38(d) explicitly permits ex post contractual waiver
of the right to jury trial. However, courts have also enforced ex ante agreements to waive this
right. See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Thom Rock Realty Co., 46 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 1995);
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986). On jury trial waivers, see Ste-
phen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Con-
stitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 167, 169-70 (2004); Chester S. Chuang, Assigning
CONTRACTING AROUND TWOMBLY
ify specific procedural mechanisms. For example, non-disclosure
agreements often contain pre-dispute stipulations over future provi-
sional measures. Some contracts include symmetric clauses which al-
low each party to obtain injunctive relief without being required to
post a bond or other security,88 while other contracts include asym-
metric clauses that enable only the party who might suffer irreparable
harm from breach to seek temporary injunctive relief without the ne-
cessity of posting a bond or other security.89
In this Part, we examine the advantages of pre-dispute contractual
stipulations, both symmetric and asymmetric, as they affect pleading
standards. In Part IV, we demonstrate how such stipulations may in-
deed be incorporated into the contract, and we compare the costs of
doing so before and after Twombly. We show that while the pre-
Twombly pleading standard was difficult to incorporate into a con-
tract and implement in court, contracting around Twombly is easier
and is therefore expected to be applied more often.
A. Symmetric Application of the Pleading Standard
The main obstacle in agreeing to modify the Twombly pleading
standard after a dispute arises is the standard's distributive effect.
Any post-dispute agreement could change the outcome of the litiga-
tion, thus benefiting one litigant at the expense of his adversary. This
is not necessarily the case, however, before the dispute arises.
An agreement to opt out of Twombly and embrace the pre-
Twombly standard is more likely at the time of contracting because
the parties are acting behind a "veil of ignorance."90 They typically do
not know which of the many contingencies that could lead to a dispute
will actually materialize. They do not necessarily know who will as-
sume the role of plaintiff or defendant and which party will be more
likely to benefit from adopting a particular pleading standard.91
the Burden of Proof in Contractual Jury Waiver Challenges, How Valuable Is Your Right to a
Jury Trial?, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 205, 207-08 (2006).
88. See, e.g., Asset and Purchase Agreement between The Brown Schools, Inc. and Psychiatric
Solutions, Inc. (Feb. 13, 2003), available at cori.missouri.edu/pages/ksearch.htm (registration
required).
89. Employment Agreement Between Infocrossing, Inc. and Charles Auster § 10(c) (June 15,
2000), available at core.missouri.edu/pageslksearch.htm (search for "Contract ID 688028").
90. The concept of a "veil of ignorance" was first introduced by JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 136-37 (1971), which states that when the parties are assumed to be situated behind a
veil of ignorance "[t]hey do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particu-
lar case."
91. Procedural arrangements can also affect the risk exposure of the parties. They may either
increase that risk or decrease it depending on the circumstances. There are also non-strategic
reasons why procedural stipulations are more likely before the dispute than after it, as the par-
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Take, for example, a simple partnership contract. Such a contract
often relies on mutual and shared trust between the partners, as
neither partner can monitor each and every action of his counterpart.
Consequently, in the case of a disagreement, one partner might hold
information and documents (concerning accounting issues, for exam-
ple) which the other partner might not possess. This implies that the
Twombly pleading standard might prevent the latter from crossing the
pleading threshold even if she is certain that her counterpart breached
his contractual obligations. The lack of necessary facts to substantiate
her allegations would thus prevent her from pursuing her suit because
she might not be able to obtain the information without discovery.
As we already explained, the distributive effects of modifying the
pleading standard could impede any post-dispute stipulation over it.
After the dispute arises, the defendant would not agree to a pre-
Twombly standard because the Twombly standard would enable him
to more easily pursue a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the lawsuit. How-
ever, because at the time of contract neither partner knows who will
be the one to sue or to be sued, they may prefer to opt for the more
relaxed pre-Twombly standard.
The parties' agreement to a symmetric pre-Twombly standard
would enable each partner to file a suit in the event of a dispute with-
out concern that the information supporting his claim might only be in
the possession of his co-partner. This agreement would increase the
parties' joint contractual surplus, solidify their mutual trust, and
strengthen their relationship. Agreeing to the pre-Twombly standard
also would increase the parties' incentives to perform their contractual
obligations because each would know that the other could easily sur-
vive dismissal of the lawsuit in the event of a default. At the same
time, the parties' future distributive gains and losses from their stipu-
ties are less subject to psychological barriers and biases. For review of such psychological effects
at the time of litigation, see, for example, Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudi-
cated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 ITr'L REv. L. & ECON. 289
(1995) (exploring litigants' over-optimism and risk preferences as a function of their assigned
role in experimental settings); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Liti-
gation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129-42 (1994) (showing
that even in the absence of strategic bargaining, psychological processes create barriers that pre-
clude out-of-court settlements in some cases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psy-
chology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (analyzing the effects of framing theory of
risk on litigants' decision making); but see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Eco-
nomics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REV. 77 (1997) (pro-
viding experimental evidence supportive of the hypothesis that lawyers as a class share an
analytical orientation to decision making that can correct for litigants' psychological barriers and
biases).
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lation would cancel each other out because they are equally likely to
either benefit or suffer from it.
So far we have shown that an agreement to waive the right to file a
motion to dismiss or similarly to opt for the pre-Twombly pleading
standard can be desirable for both contracting parties at the pre-dis-
pute stage if at that stage, the parties' information regarding future
litigation contingencies is symmetric and if such a stipulation is not
expected to undermine the interest of one contracting party at the
expense of her counterpart. In the following sections, we demonstrate
that even if we relax both assumptions of pre-dispute symmetric infor-
mation and post-dispute symmetric application of the pre-Twombly
standard, an arrangement to opt for this standard can still be achieved.
B. Realizing Pre-Dispute Efficiencies
As we demonstrated, any pleading standard affects the pre-dispute
behavior of prospective litigants. Just as the Twombly standard might
impact the behavior of prospective litigants before the dispute, a stip-
ulation to adopt the pre-Twombly standard might also have an effect
on the contracting parties' behavior. While at the post-dispute stage
the adversaries will not modify the pleading standard due to its zero-
sum effect, at the pre-dispute stage they may choose to modify the
standard if it allows them to realize pre-dispute efficiencies, even if
the application of the standard is expected to be asymmetric.
This proposition can be demonstrated using a numerical example.
Suppose that in a contract between a food chain store and a supplier,
the parties expect that the supplier will hold private information re-
garding the quality of his products and that the chain store can only
obtain the information through discovery. Suppose also that the value
of the contract for the chain store is 100 if the product's quality is high,
and the supplier's cost is 70. If the quality is low, the value of the
contract for the chain store is only 80 and its cost for the supplier is 60.
In this example, the joint surplus of high quality products is 30 (100-
70), and the joint surplus of low quality products is only 20 (80-60).
Therefore, both parties would prefer a contract requiring the supplier
to provide high quality products.
In this case, the parties might prefer a pre-Twombly standard at the
contracting stage. Although a pre-dispute stipulation for a pre-
Twombly standard would have asymmetric implications, this stipula-
tion would nevertheless increase the parties' welfare. If the parties do
not opt for such a standard, then a combination of post-dispute infor-
mation asymmetry and the Twombly standard might bar future meri-
torious lawsuits by the chain store even if the quality supplied is low.
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The parties would have little incentive to agree to high quality prod-
ucts if these problems prevented effective enforcement of any contrac-
tual obligation on the matter.
Because the parties' joint surplus resulting from a contract for high
quality products is higher than one for low quality products, the par-
ties can agree at the outset to opt for a pre-Twombly standard and
divide the excess surplus of 10 (30-20) at the time of contracting.
Under this standard, the supplier would know that the chain store's
threat to sue is credible in the event that he defaults and provides low
quality products. The supplier would therefore provide high quality
products as agreed. Thus, although opting for a pre-Twombly stan-
dard may work against the supplier after the dispute arises, it is in his
interest to adopt it at the time of contracting.92
To summarize, opting out of Twombly at the contracting stage can
affect the parties' behavior and induce better performance of their
contractual obligations. The excess surplus they can realize by opting
for a pre-Twombly pleading standard does not depend on the symme-
try of the future application of their agreement. Such an arrangement
is possible even if it is more likely to benefit one party than the other.
The latter would still opt for the pre-Twombly standard because he
can share the pre-dispute excess surplus at the time of contracting.
C. Conveying Pre-Contractual Information
We have assumed so far that the parties' information about future
contingencies is symmetric at the time of contracting. This assump-
tion, however, is not always accurate. A negotiating party may pos-
sess private information that his partner cannot verify prior to
contracting.
Take, for example, a start-up company and a large technology firm
that enter a joint venture agreement for the development of a new
technological product. The start-up might hold private information
pertaining to the prospect of its product's success. However, both par-
ties would find it difficult to verify such information at the time of
contracting, especially if the start-up is concerned about opportunistic
use of this information by the large firm.
The informed party could signal its private information by assuming
additional contractual obligations. In the joint venture example, the
start-up could agree to pay high liquidated damages in the event of
92. Clearly, opting for the pre-Twombly standard is desirable only when the parties' concern
with future frivolous suits is low and the cost of future information asymmetry is high. Other-
wise, they may abstain from such modification.
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failure. 93 The higher the start-up's probability of success, the lower
the expected cost of such a commitment. Therefore, the higher the
start-up's probability of success, the lower the premium it would de-
mand for assuming the risk of future liquidated damages.
However, the effectiveness of a liquidated damages provision, or
any other substantive mechanism for that matter, depends on the rele-
vant pleading standard. If the start-up continues to hold its private
information by the time development fails, the technology firm might
find it difficult to satisfy the Twombly pleading standard in court.
This obstacle would render the liquidated damages provision ineffec-
tive. Thus, a signal by the start-up might require more than a substan-
tive obligation. The start-up may have to agree to lower the pleading
threshold to enable the firm to file a suit and move to discovery in the
event of a breach.
The start-up can contract to adopt the pre-Twombly standard. Be-
cause the costs of such a stipulation would be higher for a start-up that
believes its prospects are low than for a start-up that believes its pros-
pects are high, the start-up may use this procedural stipulation to sig-
nal to the firm this information about its prospects.
More concretely, suppose that the probability of success is low-0.2,
for example, for an average start-up, but this probability is 0.7 for a
select few start-ups. Suppose also that the technology firm will sue the
start-up whenever the product fails and that the parties agree on liqui-
dated damages of 100. Finally, suppose that any such future lawsuit
will be dismissed if the pleading standard is high.
An average start-up is subject to suit with a probability of 0.8,
whereas the high-probability start-up expects to be sued only with a
probability of 0.3. As such, the expected cost of agreeing to a low
pleading standard is 80 for the average start-up but only 30 for the
high-probability start-up. In fact, if we assume that the start-up's lia-
bility would depend on its private records-which would be discov-
ered if a lawsuit were filed and survived a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss-then the expected cost of agreeing to a low pleading stan-
dard would be even lower for the high-probability start-up because no
damaging evidence would be uncovered.
If the firm offers to increase the premium it pays the start-up in
return for a low pre-Twombly standard by 50, for example, then only
a high-probability start-up would agree to such an offer. The average
93. For a discussion of liquidated damages as a signaling device, see Alan Schwartz, The Myth
that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage
Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 379 (1990).
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start-up would demand a higher minimum premium for this modifica-
tion and would therefore decline the firm's offer. The high-
probability start-up can signal its private information by agreeing to
lower the pleading standard in return for any premium which is lower
than 80.
It is important to distinguish between the different uses of pre-dis-
pute pleading standard stipulations. The stipulation used in the above
example is not meant to change the start-up's primary behavior.
Rather, its aim is to enable efficient signaling. This aim is different
from the one we gave in the previous Part in which the stipulation was
used to shape pre-dispute behavior. In the example here, it is as-
sumed that the probability of success varies among start-ups not be-
cause of their investment in development after contracting, but
because of private information they hold before contracting. 94 Modifi-
cation of the procedural mechanism in this example was therefore
used only to signal pre-contractual information.
In conclusion, by agreeing at the contracting stage to a pre-
Twombly stipulation, contracting parties have the opportunity to sig-
nal their private information to each other. The modifiable pleading
standard thus serves as a welfare-enhancing, information-producing
mechanism for the contracting parties, and this mechanism may be
unavailable otherwise.
IV. TWOMBLY AS A DEFAULT PLEADING STANDARD
So far we have shown that by opting for the pre-Twombly standard,
contracting parties can resolve inadequate screening and realize pre-
and post-dispute gains. In this Part, we make two further claims. The
first claim is observational: we explain why the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Twombly and Iqbal present an opportunity for contracting
parties to make pre-dispute pleading stipulations and show that such
an opportunity is easier to implement today than it was in the pre-
Twombly era. We show that contracting around the heightened
Twombly standard in favor of the liberal pre-Twombly standard is
much easier to negotiate, draft, and enforce than the reverse
modification.
94. See generally Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of
Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008), which demonstrates how litigation costs can
help induce efficient behavior given the possible abuse of the legal system and its inaccuracy.
Thus, their argument concerns the necessity of litigation costs to overcome moral hazard
problems. Id. Our argument here is different, as it shows how the choice of the pre-Twombly
standard allows the parties to overcome adverse selection problems. For a similar argument, see
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J.
814, 863-64 (2006).
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Our second claim is normative: we maintain that the lower costs of
contracting around the Twombly standard must be taken into account
when evaluating its effects in contract cases. We explain that even if
the Twombly standard is not the standard that most parties would
have contracted for if given the choice,95 it may nevertheless prove
preferable for contracting parties compared with the pre-Twombly
standard due to the lower costs of contracting around it.
A. The Low Costs of Contracting Around Twombly
Contracting parties who agree at the pre-dispute stage that the ap-
plication of the Twombly standard might inadequately screen merito-
rious claims may opt out of it using one of two possible options. One
option is to modify the standard directly and adopt the pre-Twombly
standard. The other option is to agree at the outset to waive the right
to file a 12(b)(6) motion if a suit is filed. Either option would assure
the parties that in the event of a dispute, neither party would likely be
barred from pursuing discovery to obtain any information necessary
to substantiate its allegations. 96
There are various possible formulations for adopting the pre-
Twombly pleading standard in a contract. Recent proposals in the
United States Senate and House of Representatives provide servicea-
ble language for such provisions. For example, the Notice Pleading
Restoration Act of 2009 provides that a court "shall not dismiss com-
plaints under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Conley v. Gibson."97 Another option would fol-
low the language of Conley as proposed by the Open Access to Courts
Act of 2009, which reads, "A court shall not dismiss a complaint under
subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff
to relief."98 Clearly, there are many other possible contractual formu-
lations for implementing the same standard, and elaborating on their
exact wordings exceeds the scope of this Article. It suffices to note
95. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
96. The parties may employ one-sided modification that would apply only if one of them is to
file a lawsuit. Although such modifications implicate similar arguments as the symmetric modifi-
cation we analyze, they may still raise some distinctive concerns. In the interest of clarity, we
leave the analysis of these modifications for future research.
97. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
98. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
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that any of these formulations would simply revert back to the legal
equivalent of the pre-Twombly standard.
Waiving the right to file a 12(b)(6) motion in either a future lawsuit
or in certain pre-defined situations is much easier to implement as
well as to enforce than the adoption of the pre-Twombly standard. 99
The clear language of such a stipulation would avoid uncertainty in
interpretation by expressly denying the defendant's right to file a mo-
tion to dismiss. Simplicity, however, may come at the cost of over-
inclusiveness because it would give the plaintiff wide latitude to file
many types of lawsuits.100
Like any contractual arrangement, a pre-dispute stipulation modify-
ing a pleading standard imposes bargaining and formation costs on the
parties. The parties are likely to evaluate these costs against the bene-
fits of a modification when deciding on the terms of the contract. Be-
cause these costs are more certain than the benefits at the time of
contracting, the benefits must be large enough to justify the costs of
contracting.
Whatever option the parties choose to adopt when agreeing to con-
tract around the Twombly standard, this option would clearly be much
easier to implement than attempting the reverse modification during
the pre-Twombly era. During the pre-Twombly era, if contracting
parties were to adopt a different standard, they would have had to
adopt and formulate a novel, heightened pleading standard specifi-
cally tailored to their needs. Formulating the limits of a new height-
ened pleading standard would have proven cumbersome and
increased the costs of negotiating and drafting that standard.
Moreover, the parties would have difficulty in predicting how courts
would interpret their tailored standard. Accustomed to the pre-
Twombly standard, courts would be confronted with enormous diffi-
99. Furthermore, opting for a pre- Twombly standard might seem more complex than agreeing
not to file a 12(b)(6) motion because some commentators have argued that Twombly did not
change any of the Supreme Court's prior notice-pleading thresholds. See sources cited supra
note 39.
100. The choice between a pre-Twombly standard and a waiver of the right to file a 12(b)(6)
motion is similar, in some respects, to the choice between a standard-type and a rule-type stipu-
lation. See generally Scott & Triantis, supra note 94, at 814, whose key insight is that contracting
parties can efficiently shift costs between the time of contracting and the time of dispute by
varying the degree of precision of contract provisions and terminology. Similarly, parties can
increase what Scott and Triantis call the "incentive bang for the contracting-cost buck" by modi-
fying evidentiary rules that would apply to future disputes. Id. at 823. See also Choi & Triantis,
supra note 94, at 503 (demonstrating that increasing litigation costs may induce better incentives
to perform contractual obligations); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997) (discussing the advantages of contracting around preferred bank-
ruptcy procedures).
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culties in interpreting and applying the parties' specific standard. As
the enormous amount of scholarship following Twombly demon-
strates,101 even if the standard is well-settled, there are difficulties in
interpreting and applying it. An attempt to implement a similar stan-
dard embedded in a contract would have certainly created enormous
interpretational uncertainties.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a contractually tailored
heightened pleading standard would have severely limited the plain-
tiff's access to court and courts would have been unlikely to enforce it.
The turmoil following the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal is only further suggestive of the harsh implications of any such
change.
In contrast, the costs of contracting around Twombly are lower and
the likelihood that such a contract would be enforced in court is
higher. This is true especially if the parties agree to waive the right to
file a motion to dismiss and also if they opt for the alternative ap-
proach of formulating their own pre-Twombly standard. Drafting
their own pre-Twombly standard requires the parties to refer back to
the well-established formulation in Conley. That standard is a mini-
mal one and operates as a natural focal point on which the parties may
agree.
All these factors imply low negotiation and formulation costs as
well as low costs of enforcement by the court. Consequently, there is
a high likelihood that such a stipulation would indeed be effectively
enforced. Furthermore, opting out of the Twombly standard provides
greater potential access to the courts and therefore does not raise any
constitutional concerns. The high likelihood of enforcement of a pre-
Twombly stipulation clearly maximizes the utility from incorporating
this standard into the contract.
B. Evaluating Twombly in Contract Cases
The comparison between the Twombly and the pre-Twombly plead-
ing standards in contract cases is informed by two rationales. One
rationale advocates the majoritarian standard-this is the standard
that most parties would have contracted for if they had a choice. The
alternative rationale advocates the standard that minimizes the costs
of contracting around, implementing, and failing to modify the plead-
ing standard.102 The two rationales do not stand in conflict because
101. See sources cited supra note 39.
102. For a comparison of the two rationales in substantive law, see generally Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 92-93 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian v. Minoritarian Defaults,
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contracting parties must consider both the costs of modification and
the number of cases in which such modification would be necessary. 103
We now demonstrate how these rationales affect the desirability of the
two pleading standards.
As we explained, contracting parties would choose the Twombly
standard when they expect to hold symmetric information at the time
of the dispute and when they expect the plaintiff to file a frivolous suit
designed to impose high discovery costs on the defendant. Con-
versely, parties would choose the pre-Twombly standard when they
expect that the prospective defendant would hold private information
necessary for the plaintiff to substantiate her claim. 104 Because dis-
covery costs are low105 and information is symmetric in most contract
cases, the pre-Twombly standard may be optimal for most cases. But
the Twombly standard may nevertheless prove better for contracting
parties because its modification is much easier to incorporate into the
contract and enforce in court.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that contracting parties would
prefer the pre-Twombly standard to apply in 90% of cases and the
Twombly standard in the remaining 10% of cases. Suppose also that
the expected loss of efficiency due to any inadequate pleading stan-
dard is 100.106 Finally, suppose that modification cost of the Twombly
standard is 10, whereas the pre-Twombly standard is too costly to
modify.107
Under the pre-Twombly standard, the total cost would equal 10-
an inefficiency cost of 100 in 10% of the cases. Under the Twombly
standard, there would be no inefficiency cost because all contracting
parties that prefer the pre-Twombly standard would contract for it.
Yet each modification would cost 10. Thus, the total cost of the
Twombly standard would equal 9-a modification cost of 10 in 90%
51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian v. Minoritarian
Defaults].
103. See Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian v. Minoritarian Defaults, supra note 102, at 1593 (ex-
plaining how the choice between majoritarian and minoritarian defaults should be made); Lu-
cian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284, 287 (1991) ("The measure
of social welfare is taken to be the sum of buyers' expected value from contract performance,
less seller's costs of precautions, and less parties' costs of communication.").
104. See discussion supra Part II.C.
105. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531 (1998) (finding that
"for most cases, discovery costs are modest").
106. This expected loss takes into account the probability of pre- and post-dispute inefficien-
cies that would result from the improper standard.
107. In particular, this implies that the costs of modification are higher than 100.
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of the cases. Therefore, in this example, the Twombly standard is
more efficient even though it would be modified in 90% of the cases.
Obviously, this conclusion depends on the specific assumptions
made in the example. If the modification cost of the Twombly stan-
dard were higher, if the modification cost of the pre-Twombly stan-
dard were lower (in particular, lower than the efficiency loss due to
the inadequate standard), or if the inefficiencies caused by each stan-
dard were different, then the pre-Twombly standard might prove
more efficient. On the other hand, an efficiency of the Twombly stan-
dard is its potential to signal information and screen frivolous suits
better than the pre-Twombly standard. This factor was not taken into
account in the previous example but would support its conclusion.
The literature on substantive defaults has long observed that de-
faults are "sticky" and that parties often refrain from contracting
around them.108 In the case of pleading standards, the stickiness of
the pre-Twombly standard can be explained by the specific difficulties
in contracting for a novel alternative standard and implementing it in
court. By comparison, the Twombly standard might prove less sticky
due to the relative simplicity of contracting around it. Because con-
tracting parties who wish to opt out of Twombly would revert to the
familiar standard of Conley, Twombly may prove less sticky than its
predecessor. This may make the Twombly standard preferable in con-
tract cases.
In conclusion, we do not claim that the Twombly standard is neces-
sarily more efficient or just than the pre-Twombly standard. We only
suggest that if the possibility of contracting around the pleading stan-
dard is taken into account, then the comparison of the two pleading
standards in contract cases calls for a different set of considerations
than the ones often debated in non-contractual cases. In particular, in
light of the possibility of pre-dispute modification of the pleading
standard, the costs of modification and of implementing a modified
standard should be considered. Because the Twombly standard is eas-
ier to modify than its predecessor, it may prove more efficient in con-
tract cases absent modification, even if it would perform inadequate
108. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 109 (2002).
There are many behavioral regularities that increase the stickiness of defaults, such as the status
quo bias, anchoring, and loss aversion heuristics. See Russel Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in
Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1583 (1998); Russel Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 608, 611-12 (1998). Also, informed parties may be reluctant to contract around
the default because revealing private information would have significant effect on the price or
other contract terms. See Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 617 (1990).
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screening in most of those cases. Whether the Twombly standard
would indeed prove superior depends on the proportion of contracts
that would modify it and on the costs of both modification and
implementation.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over Twombly and Iqbal is premised on the assumption
of the transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, the debate contrasts different views of the overall inefficiencies
and injustices created by alternative pleading standards. While any
pleading standard might prove efficient and just in the aggregate, any
pleading standard will also fail to realize these goals in some cases.
When parties have prior contractual relationships, they may correct
any inefficiency and injustice created by the pleading standard by con-
tracting around the standard. We explained why modifying the plead-
ing standard is simpler under the Twombly legal regime than under
the pre-Twombly standard. Hence, the Twombly standard may prove
efficient and just irrespective of its screening inadequacies if these in-
adequacies can be corrected by pre-dispute modification.
This Article does not challenge the transsubstantivity of procedural
rules, nor does it advocate adopting special rules for contract cases. It
only suggests that allowing parties the option to contract around pro-
cedural rules can improve justice and efficiency. In view of such an
option and the evaluation of the efficiency and justice in cases where
the parties have prior contractual relationships, the parties must
consider the effects and costs of such pre-dispute procedural
modifications.
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